Policy making and commission appointment in the European Union. by Crombez, Christophe
DEPARTEMENT TOEGEPASTE 
ECONOMISCHE WETENSCHAPPEN 
ONDERZOEKSRAPPORT  NR 9660 
Policy Making and  Commission Appointment 
in  the European Union 
by  . 
Christophe Crombez 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 
Naamsestraat 69,  8-3000  Leuven ONDERZOEKSRAPPORT  NR  9660 
Policy Making and  Commission Appointment 
in  the European Union 
by 
Christophe Crombez 
D/1996/2376/60 Policy Making and 
Commission Appointment 
.in tbe European Union 
*  Christophe Crombez 
Abstract 
This paper presents spatial models of Commission appointment and EU policy making. 
The theory characterizes sets of effective Commissions, i.e.,  Commissions that can be 
appointed and can successfully propose their own ideal policies, and sets of successful 
proposals, i.e., proposals that can become EU policy. It also determines equilibrium EU 
Commissions and policies. The paper focuses  on the Commission's role in EU policy 
making and discusses how recent institutional developments have affected its powers. It 
concludes that the Parliament's increased role in Commission appointment and policy 
making  has  limited  the  sets  of effective  Commissions  and  the  sets  of successful 
proposals. 
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1 1. Introduction 
The  legislative  procedures  of the  European  Union  (EU)  have  been  the  object  of 
considerable attention during the past years. The literature includes theoretical analyses of 
the  procedures,  amongst others  by  Tsebelis  (1994),  Steunenberg  (1994)  and  Crombez 
(1996, 1997). In these models equilibrium EU policies depend on the preferences of the 
Commission,  the  Parliament  and  the  member  countries,  and  these  preferences  are 
assumed to be exogenous. 1 
This paper is a first attempt at analyzing one of  the elements that shape the preferences of 
one of the  institutions.  In particular,  it endogenizes  the  Commission's preferences by 
studying  the  Commission appointment process.  The  Commission is  appointed  by  the 
Parliament and  the  countries.  Its  preferences  can thus  be  expected  to  depend  on the 
preferences of the countries and the Parliament, and on the structure of the Commission 
appointment process. 
I  introduce  a  spatial  model  of Commission appointment  and  EU  policy  making,  and 
assume  that  the  countries  and the  Parliament  have  Euclidean  preferences  over  an  n-
dimensional policy space, i.e., they each have an ideal policy and they prefer policies that 
are  closer to,  rather than farther away from,  their ideal policies.  The countries and the 
Parliament decide on an EU Commission and an EU  policy in a sequential game with 
2 complete and perfect information. First, they choose a Commission. Subsequently, they 
choose an EU  policy together with the  Commission.  They have preferences  over EU 
policy and care about the Commission only because it affects EU policy. Therefore, they 
think ahead and look at the policy making process when they appoint a Commission. 
Whether they vote in favor of the Commission depends on the policy they expect it to 
implement. Since they have complete and perfect information, they can anticipate which 
policy the Commission will successfully propose.2 
The theory characterizes sets of effective Commissions,  i.e.,  Commissions that can be 
appointed and can successfully propose their own ideal policies, and sets of successful 
proposals, i.e., proposals that can become EU  policy. These sets are  a function of the 
ideal policies of  the countries and the Parliament, and the location of  the status quo. 
I  examine  the  consequences  of the  institutional  reforms  of the  past  five  years,  in 
particular the Parliament's greater role in the appointment of the Commission and in the 
legislative  processes.  The  Parliament  has  obtained  veto  power  in  the  Commission 
appointment process, and can amend Commission proposals under the new co-decision 
procedure.  These  institutional  changes  were  introduced  to  enhance  the  democratic 
functioning  of the  EU.  I  show  that  they  have  also  reduced  the  sets  of effective 
Commissions and the sets of  successful proposals. 
3 In the  next  section I  introduce  the  model.  The  third  section characterizes  the  sets  of 
successful  proposals  and  the  equilibrium  policies  under  the  two  principal  legislative 
procedures:  the consultation and co-decision procedures.3  In the fourth  section I derive 
the  sets  of effective  Commissions  and  the  equilibrium  EU  Commissions  under  both 
procedures. The fifth section presents the conclusions. 
2. The Model 
I present a spatial model of Commission appointment and EU policy making. Alternative 
EU policies are represented by points in an n-dimensional policy space. Each dimension 
corresponds  to  a  specific  policy  issue,  such  as  the  allowable  noncocoa  fat  level  in 
chocolate or the length of daylight saving time. EU policy making can then be thought of 
as choosing a point in the policy space. 
I assume that countries have Euclidean preferences over the EU policy  pep  1 , ••• , p") , 
with  ideal  policy  P  k (p  k I ,. .. ,p /'  )  for  country  k.4  I  refer  to  the  EU  policy  pi  on 
dimension i as the i-policy, and to country k's ideal policy p/ on dimension i as country 
k's ideal  i-policy.  5  Parliamentarians and potential  Commissioners are  also  assumed to 
have Euclidean preferences over EU policy. 
4 The  general  structure  of the  model  is  summarized  in  Figure  1.  The  countries,  as 
represented in the Council, and the Parliament first form a Commission. There are three 
steps in the Commission appointment process: (1) the countries nominate a Commission 
President, (2) the nominated Commission President and the countries nominate the other 
Commissioners, and (3) the Parliament and the countries appoint the Commission. When 
the Commission is  formed,  the  Commission, the Parliament and the countries together 
decide  on an EU  policy.  For the  policy  making  process  I  consider the two  principal 
legislative procedures: the consultation and co-decision procedures. 
----- Figure 1 about here-----
The EU treaties do not specify any further how the Commission President and the other 
Commissioners  are  nominated  in the  first  two  steps  of the  Commission appointment 
process.  I make  specific,  simplifying assumptions  concerning the first  two  steps,  and 
focus  on the  third  step,  the  actual  appointment of the  Commission.  The  conclusions 
concentrate on the sets of effective Commissions and successful proposals. The specific 
assumptions do not alter these sets, because the sets depend on the third step and on the 
policy making process. In the subsequent paragraphs I discuss the sequential structure of 
the model in more detail. 
5 The  first  step  of  the  Commission  appointment  process,  the  nomination  of  the 
Commission President is shown in Figure 2. In the first stage Nature selects the country k 
that is  to  propose a Commission President.  Country k's selection probability could, for 
example, be equal to its share of Commissioners.  6 In the third stage the countries vote on 
the  proposed  Commission  President.  If  all  countries  vote  in  favor,  the  proposed 
Commission President is nominated and the Commission appointment process continues. 
Otherwise, the status quo prevails.? The status quo is either the policy agreed on under a 
previous Commission, or the result of existing national policies. On the daylight saving 
time  issue,  for  example,  the  status  quo  would  be  daylight  saving  time  from  the  last 
weekend of March until the last weekend of October.  On the chocolate issue, the status 
quo would be the absence of  an internal market. 
-----Figure 2 about here-----
Figure  3  presents  the  second  step  of  the  Commission  appointment  process,  the 
nomination  of the  other  Commissioners.  First Nature  selects  the  country  I  that  is  to 
propose the second Commissioner. Country l's selection probability could, for example, 
be  equal to  its  share of the Commissioners that still  need to  be  nominated. Next, the 
nominated Commission President can accept or reject the proposed Commissioner. If he 
accepts,  the  proposed  Commissioner  is  nominated.  If he  rejects,  he  nominates  a 
Commissioner  instead.8  This  process  is  repeated  until  the  required  number  of 
Commissioners, currently 20, has been nominated. 9 
6 -----Figure 3 about here-----
Figure  4  shows  the  third  step  of the  Commission  appointment  process,  the  actual 
appointment of  the Commission. The countries and the Parliament vote on the nominated 
Commission as a whole. They do not vote on individual Commissioners separately. If all 
countries and the Parliament vote in favor of the nominated Commission, it takes office. 
Otherwise, no Commission is formed and the status quo prevails. 
-----Figure 4 about here-----
After  the  appointment  of the  Commission  the  countries  and  institutions  turn  their 
attention to policy making. I assume that n policy issues arise during the Commission's 
term and that the countries and institutions deal with these n policy issues one issue at a 
time. 10  Since the countries, the Parliamentarians and the Commissioners have Euclidean 
preferences, their preferences  over the  i-policy are  independent of the  ED policies on 
other dimensions. Country k's utility, for example, decreases as the i-policy moves farther 
away  from  country  k's  ideal  i-policy  p/,  whatever  the  ED  policies  on  the  other 
dimensions are. As a result, ED policy making on dimension i can be studied as if  it were 
the only relevant dimension. 
7 The  Commission  and  the  Parliament  use  simple  majority  rule,  and  there  are  no 
restrictions  on  amendments.  As  a  consequence,  the  analysis  of policy  making  on 
dimension  i  can  be  simplified  by  focusing  on  the  ideal  i-policies  of the  i-median 
Commissioner and the i-median Parliamentarian.  Suppose the i-status quo  qi  is  to  the 
right  (left)  of  the  i-median  Commissioner's  ideal  i-policy  Pc i •  The  i-median 
Commissioner and all  Commissioners on his  left (right) then want a move to the  left 
(right). There is thus a majority for such a move. As a result, any i-policy is defeated in 
the  Commission by  i-policies  that  are  closer to  the  i-median  Commissioner's ideal  i-
policy, and the i-median Commissioner's ideal i-policy defeats any other i-policy. Similar 
reasoning  applies  to  voting  in  the  Parliament.  With  respect  to  policy  making  on 
dimension i the Commission and the Parliament can thus be treated as unitary actors with 
ideal i-policies equal to their i-median voters' ideal policies, P  /  and p  /  respectively.ll 
The Council is not represented as a unitary actor because it uses qualified majority rule. 
Nonetheless, the analysis of policy making on dimension i can be simplified by focusing 
on the countries that are i-pivotal under the qualified majority rule. To defeat the status 
quo and move EU policy to the right on dimension i the support of  the country with the i-
median vote (the 44th vote) and all countries to its right is not sufficient. Under qualified 
majority rule 62 out of a total of 87 votes are needed. 12 The i-pivotal country  ai  thus has 
an ideal policy to the left of the country with the i-median vote. In particular, country  ai 
is the country with the 26th vote (from the left). Country ai  and the countries to its right 
8 then have  62  votes,  and the countries to  its right do  not constitute a qualified majority 
without country ai . Similarly, the country bi  that is i-pivotal for a move to the left has an 
ideal i-policy to the right of the country with the i-median vote. It is the country with the 
62nd vote (from the left).l3 
Policy  making  on  dimension  i  starts  with  a  proposal  from  the  Commission.  The 
Commission proposal goes through one of the ED's legislative procedures.  The model 
focuses  on  the  consultation  and  co-decision  procedures.  Crombez  (1996)  presents  a 
model  of the  consultation  procedure,  and  Crombez  (1997)  studies  the  co-decision 
procedure. This model uses simplified versions of  those models. 
The  consultation  procedure  is  shown  in  Figure  5.  First,  the  Commission  proposes  a 
policy. Next, the countries vote on the Commission proposal in the Council. The proposal 
is  adopted if a  qualified majority  in the  Council  supports  it.  If the proposal  does  not 
obtain a qualified majority, the status quo prevails.I4 
----- Figure 5 about here-----
The  co-decision  procedure  is  shown  in  Figure  6.  In  the  first  stage  the  Commission 
proposes  a  policy.  In the  second  stage  the  Parliament can offer  a joint text. IS  If the 
Council  accepts the joint text by  a qualified majority in the  third stage,  the joint text 
becomes ED policy. If the Parliament does not propose a joint text or the Council rejects 
9 it, the Parliament votes on the Commission proposal in the fourth stage. If  the Parliament 
accepts the proposal and the Council confirms it by a qualified majority in the final stage, 
then the proposal becomes ED policy. Otherwise, the status quo prevails. 
----- Figure 6 about here-----
The model incorporates complete and perfect information. The countries, the Parliament 
and the Commission know each other's preferences, the location of the status quo,  the 
impact of proposed policies, the sequential structure of the model, and the actions taken 
in prior stages of the model. They know which issues they will be addressing during the 
C  ..,  16  ommlsslOn s term. 
An  equilibrium  consists  of  a  strategy  for  each  country,  the  Parliament  and  the 
Commission.  Strategies  tell  the  countries,  the  Parliament  and  the .  Commission  what 
actions to choose in the relevant stages of the procedure, given the actions taken in prior 
stages. Thus, a strategy for the Commission tells the Commission what proposals to make 
on the n policy issues.  Countries' strategies tell them which Commission President and 
Commissioners to  p~.()pose, how to vote on the nomination of  the Commission President, 
on the Commission appointment, on the Commission proposals, and on the Parliament's 
joint texts under the co-decision procedure. The Parliament's strategy says how to vote on 
the  Commission  appointment,  what  joint  texts  to  propose  and  how  to  vote  on  the 
Commission proposal under the co-decision procedure. 
10 The equilibrium concept is  sub game perfect Nash. In a Nash equilibrium, no country or 
institution can increase its utility by choosing another strategy, given the other countries' 
and  institutions'  strategies.  In  a  sub game  perfect  Nash  equilibrium,  countries  and 
institutions can do  no better than stick to their strategies in any stage of the procedure, 
even if a country or institution deviated from its strategy in a prior stage. 
3. Policy Making 
In  this  section I characterize the  sets  of successful  proposals  and the  equilibrium ED 
policies for any configuration of ideal policies and for any location of the status quo.  I 
study  the  consultation and  co-decision  procedures.  For each procedure  I  first  look at 
policy making on a single dimension i.  As mentioned above, policy making on dimension 
i can be studied as if it were the only relevant dimension. I go through the different steps 
of the procedure, determine the set of successful i-proposals and the equilibrium i-policy, 
and I analyze the equilibrium i-policy as a function of the location of the Commission's 
ideal i-policy. Subsequently, I look at the entire policy space and characterize the set of 
successful proposals and the equilibrium ED policy in the n-dimensional policy space. 
11 3.1 Policy Making under the Consultation Procedure 
The Commission starts policy making on dimension  i  by proposing an  i-policy  pi, as 
shown in Figure 5.  It wants the  i-policy to  be as  close to  its ideal i-policy as  possible. 
This  does  not  imply,  however,  that the  Commission  proposes  its  ideal  i-policy.  The 
Commission understands the role the Council plays in the next stage of  the procedure and 
takes this into account when it makes its proposal. It thinks ahead and looks at the second 
stage to  find  out which proposals  will  be  successful.  In equilibrium the  Commission 
proposal is thus based on its expectations about what will happen in the subsequent stage. 
In the second stage the countries vote on the Commission proposal in the Council. They 
compare it to the status quo. A qualified majority then approves the Commission proposal 
if a qualified majority prefers it to the status quo. The set  CSi  of successful i-proposals 
under  the  consultation  procedure,  i.e.,  the  set  of i-policies  that  the  Commission can 
successfully propose, is thus the set of i-policies that are preferred to the status quo by a 
qualified majority in the Council. 
To  illustrate policy  making  on dimension  i I  use  the  configuration of ideal  i-policies 
shown in Figure 7.  Country ai, the Parliament and the Commission, with ideal i-policies 
12 Pai, ppi  and  p/ respectively, have ideal i-policies to  the right of the status quo.  For 
simplicity, the status quo  qi  is assumed to be equal to zero. The Parliament has an ideal 
i-policy to  the  left of countries  ai  and  bi  that are pivotal under the qualified majority 
rule, whereas the Commission is  located more to the right. The configuration of ideal i-
policies was chosen because it is not unlike the actual configuration in a left-right policy 
space and because it clearly demonstrates the differences between the procedures. 
----- Figure 7 about here-----
In Figure 7 country  ai  and thus a qualified majority prefer a move to the right. The set 
CSi  of successful proposals is then the set of i-policies country  ai  prefers to the status 
quo. This set contains all i-policies that are closer to country ai,s ideal i-policy than is the 
status quo. 
In the first stage the Commission successfully proposes the i-policy  Pc/ that belongs to 
the  set  CSi  and  is  closest to  its  ideal  i-policy.  The  i-policy  Pc/  is  approved  by  a 
qualified majority in the Council and thus becomes the equilibrium i-policy. In Figure 7 
the equilibrium i-policy is the Commission's ideal i-policy, i.e.,  Pc/ = p/ . 
Figure 8 shows the equilibrium i-policy under the consultation procedure as a function of 
the  location of the  Commission's ideal  i-policy.  If the  Commission's ideal  i-policy is 
13 located in the set  CSi ,  as in Figure 7, the Commission successfully proposes its ideal i-
policy. The equilibrium i-policy can then be represented by a diagonal line: it is equal to 
the Commission's ideal i-policy. If the Commission's ideal i-policy is to the right of the 
set  CSi ,  the Commission cannot successfully propose its ideal i-policy because country 
ai  prefers  the  status  quo.  There  is  thus  no  qualified  majority  in  favor  of  the 
Commission's  ideal  i-policy.  The  Commission  then  proposes  the  i-policy  2[/  a  that 
makes country  ai  indifferent to the status quo.  If the Commission's ideal i-policy is to 
the  left  of the  set  CSi ,  country  ai  and  the  Commission  want  to  move  in  opposite 
directions. As a result, the status quo prevails. 17 
-----Figure 8 about here-----
The n i-proposals that the Commission makes during the policy making process can be 
thought of as constituting a proposal in the n-dimensional policy space.  Such a proposal 
is  then  successful  if each  of its  i-proposals  is  successful.  The  set  CS  of successful 
proposals is thus the set of  policies such that each of its i-policies is preferred to the status 
quo by a qualified majority, i.e., CS={p(i,···,pn) S.t.  pi ECSi,Vi}. 
Figure  9  shows  the  set  CS  for  a  particular  configuration  of ideal  policies  in a  two-
dimensional policy space. In Figure 9 the two policies that the EU is  addressing during 
the  Commission's term are  (1)  economic policy  (market liberalization)  and  (2)  social 
14 policy (cohesion). The ideal policies of the countries and the Parliament were chosen for 
illustrative purposes but correspond to reality. The "southern"  countries (Spain, Greece, 
Ireland,  Italy  and  Portugal)  want to  move  far  on cohesion,  but want  little  change  on 
market liberalization. They have a total of 31  votes in the Council. The United Kingdom, 
with 10 votes, wants a lot more liberalization, but little change on cohesion. The "core" 
countries  (Belgium,  Germany,  France,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands  and  Austria),  as 
well  as  the  "northern"  countries  (Denmark,  Finland  and  Sweden)  have  intermediate 
positions on both issues. They have 36 and 10 votes respectively. The Parliament's ideal 
policy is between the ideal policies of the core and the southern countries. The southern 
countries are pivotal on market liberalization, whereas the core countries are pivotal on 
cohesion. The set CS is then the  set of policies that are preferred to the status quo  on 
market liberalization by the southern countries and on cohesion by the core countries. 
-----Figure 9 about here-----
During the policy making process the Commission successfully proposes the policy  Pes 
that belongs to the set  CS  and is closest to  its ideal policy. Suppose the Commission's 
ideal policy is equal to the core countries' ideal policy in Figure 9. The Commission can 
then successfully propose its ideal policy on cohesion, since the core countries are pivotal 
on  cohesion.  The  Commission cannot successfully propose  its  ideal policy on market 
liberalization however.  The southern countries are pivotal on market liberalization and 
they  prefer  the  status  quo  to  the  Commission's  ideal  policy.  On  liberalization  the 
15 Commission then proposes the policy  2  Pal  that makes the southern countries indifferent 
to  the  status  quo.  In Figure  9  the  Commission thus  successfully  proposes  the  policy 
Pes  (2 Pal, P  a  2).  Any  Commission  with  an  ideal  policy  on  the  dotted  line  would 
successfully propose the same policy. 
3.2 Policy Making under the Co-Decision Procedure 
Again, I first look at policy making on a single dimension i.  The last two stages of the 
procedure, as  shown in Figure 6,  are  reached if the Parliament and the  Council fail  to 
agree on a joint text. In the last two stages the Parliament and the Council vote on the 
Commission proposal. They compare the proposal to the status quo. A qualified majority 
in the Council then approves the proposal if it belongs to the set  CSi •  The Parliament 
approves the proposal if it belongs to the set  Epi  of i-policies the Parliament prefers to 
the  status quo.  For approval in the last two  stages of the procedure, the  proposal thus 
needs to be preferred to the status quo by a qualified majority in the Council and by the 
Parliament. 
In Figure 10 country  ai  prefers an i-policy to the right of the Parliament's ideal i-policy. 
It wants to move farther away from the status quo than the Parliament. A proposal that is 
16 approved by the Parliament is then also confirmed by a qualified majority in the Council. 
In Figure 10 the set of  proposals that are successful in the last two stages of  the procedure 
is thus the Parliament's acceptance set Epi. 
-----Figure 10 about here-----
Suppose the Commission proposal is preferred to the status quo by the Parliament and by 
a qualified majority in the Council. Such a proposal does not necessarily reach the last 
two stages of the procedure. In the second stage the Parliament can propose a joint text, 
and this joint text becomes the i-policy if a qualified majority in the Council approves it 
in the third stage.  Since the countries think ahead, they compare the joint text to the 
proposal in the third stage. The joint text is then adopted if a qualified majority prefers it 
to the Commission proposal. 
The Parliament can thus successfully propose a joint text in the second stage if  there are i-
policies  that  a  qualified  majority  prefers  to  the  proposal.  The  Parliament  uses  this 
opportunity if it can successfully propose a joint text the Parliament itself prefers to the 
proposal. As a result, the Commission proposal does not reach the last two stages of the 
procedure if there are i-policies that the Parliament and a qualified majority prefer to it. 
The set  CDi  of successful proposals under the co-decision procedure is thus the set of 
policies that satisfy the following requirements: (1) they are preferred to the status quo by 
the Parliament and a qualified majority, and (2) no i-policy is  preferred to them by the 
17 Parliament and a  qualified majority.  The set  CDi  is  thus  a  subset of the  set  CSi  of 
successful proposals under the consultation procedure. 
In Figure 10 the Parliament successfully proposes a joint text if the Commission proposal 
is to the left of  its ideal i-policy. The Parliament, country ai  and thus a qualified majority 
then prefer an i-policy to  the  right of the  proposal.  If the proposal  is  to  the  right of 
country  bi's ideal i-policy, the Parliament also  successfully proposes a joint text.  The 
Parliament, country  bi  and thus a qualified majority then prefer an i-policy to the left of 
the proposal. If  the proposal is between the ideal i-policies of  the Parliament and country 
ai ,  the Parliament cannot successfully propose  a joint text.  The Parliament prefers  i-
policies to the left of the proposal, whereas a qualified majority in the Council prefers i-
policies to the right. If  the proposal is between the ideal i-policies of  countries ai  and bi , 
the Parliament cannot successfully propose a joint text either, since the Council cannot 
agree on a policy change by a qualified majority. In Figure 10 the set  CDi  of successful 
proposals is  thus the set of i-policies between the ideal i-policies of the Parliament and 
country bi . 
In the first stage the Commission successfully proposes the i-policy  p c/  that belongs to 
the set  CDi  and is closest to  its ideal i-policy. In Figure 10 this is  country b's ideal i-
policy, i.e., Pc/ =  Pbi . The equilibrium i-policy Pc/  under the co-decision procedure is 
18 farther from the Commission's ideal policy than is the equilibrium i-policy Pc/  under the 
consultation procedure, since the set CDi  is a subset of  the set CSi • 
Figure  11  shows  the  equilibrium  i-policy  as  a  function  of the  location  of  the 
Commission's ideal i-policy. Ifthe Commission's ideal i-policy is located in the set CDi , 
the  Commission successfully proposes  its  ideal  i-policy.  If the  Commission's ideal  i-
policy is  located right of the set  CDi,  the Commission successfully proposes the most  . 
rightist i-policy in the set  CDi.  In Figure  11  this is country  bi,s ideal i-policy. If the 
Commission's ideal i-policy is to the left of the set  CDi,  the Commission successfully 
proposes the most leftist i-policy in the set  CDi. In Figure  11  this is the Parliament's 
·d  1·  1·  18  I  ea  I-PO ICy. 
-----Figure 11  about here-----
In the n-dimensional policy space a proposal is successful if each of its  i-proposals is 
successful. The set CD of  successful proposals is thus the set of  policies such that each of 
its i-policies satisfies the following requirements: (1) it is preferred to the status quo by 
the  Parliament and a  qualified majority,  and  (2)  no  i-policy  is  preferred to  it by the 
Parliament and a qualified majority, i.e.,  CD = {  P (p 1,. .. , p") s. t.  pi  E CDi , \j  i  }. The 
set CD is a subset of  the set CS of successful proposals under the consultation procedure. 
19 In  Figure  12  proposals  left  of the  southern  countries'  ideal  policy  are  unsuccessful, 
because  the  Parliament  and  the  pivotal  southern  countries  prefer  to  move  farther  on 
market liberalization.  The  Parliament  would  thus  successfully  propose  a joint text on 
market  liberalization.  Similarly,  proposals  under  the  core  countries'  ideal  policy  are 
unsuccessful, because the Parliament and the pivotal core countries want to move farther 
on cohesion. Proposals right of  the policy 2  Pal  that makes the pivotal southern countries 
indifferent  to  the  status  quo  on  market  liberalization  are  unsuccessful,  because  the 
southern  countries  and  thus  a  qualified  majority  prefer  the  status  quo.  Similarly, 
proposals above the policy  2 P  a 2  that makes the pivotal core countries indifferent to the 
status quo on cohesion are unsuccessful, because the core countries and thus a qualified 
majority prefer the status quo.  The other policies satisfy the above conditions and thus 
constitute the set CD. 
During the policy making process the Commission successfully proposes the policy  P  cd 
that belongs to the set  CD  and is closest to its ideal policy. Suppose the Commission's 
ideal policy is equal to the core countries' ideal policy in Figure  12.  The Commission 
then successfully proposes the policy  P  cd (2 Pal, P  a  2). Any Commission with an ideal 
policy in the shaded area would successfully propose the same policy. 
20 4. Commission Appointment 
In this section I characterize the sets of effective Commissions and the  equilibrium EU 
Commission for  any configuration of ideal policies of the countries and the Parliament 
and for any location of the status quo.  Again, I first consider the consultation procedure 
and then the co-decision procedure. 
The last step of the Commission appointment process consists of the actual appointment 
of the  Commission.  It was  shown  in  Figure  4.  In this  step  the  Parliament  and  the 
countries vote on the nominated Commission. They compare the status quo to the policy 
that will be implemented if the Commission is appointed. Suppose the Commission can 
successfully  propose  its  ideal  policy,  i.e.,  Pc  E CS.  Then  the  countries  and  the 
Parliament vote in favor of the Commission if they prefer its ideal policy to the status 
quo. The Commission is appointed if all countries and the Parliament vote in favor.  All 
countries and the Parliament vote in favor if  the Commission's ideal policy belongs to the 
unanimity set U of policies that are preferred to the status quo by the Parliament and all 
countries. Prior to the approval of  the Treaty of Maastricht the Parliament's approval was 
not required. More Commissions could thus be appointed. Figure 13 shows the unanimity 
set U for the configuration of ideal policies used above. It is bounded by the indifference 
curves through the status quo of  the southern and core countries and the UK. 
21 -----Figure 13 about here-----
The set C of effective Commissions under the consultation procedure, i.e., Commissions 
that can be appointed and can successfully propose their own ideal policies, is then the set 
of Commissions whose ideal policies belong to the unanimity set U  and to the set CS of 
successful  proposals,  i.e.,  C = Un CS.  Figure  14  shows  the  set  C  of  effective 
Commissions for the configuration of ideal policies used above.  Ineffective Commissions 
in  the  shaded  area  cannot  be  appointed,  because  the  policies  they  will  successfully 
propose do  not belong to  the unanimity set.  The other ineffective Commissions can be 
appointed.  They cannot successfully propose their own ideal policies,  but propose the 
policies that belong to the set CS and are closest to their ideal policies. These policies also 
belong to the unanimity set U. 
-----Figure 14 about here-----
Prior to the votes on the Commission in the Parliament and the Council, the countries 
propose Commissioners, as shown in Figure 3. To be nominated the Commissioners need 
to  be  accepted  by  the  already  nominated  Commission  President.  I  assume  that  the 
Commission President can nominate a Commissioner himself, if he  rej ects a proposed 
Commissioner. 
22 Suppose that a Commission with the same ideal policy as the Commission President is 
effective under the consultation procedure, i.e., it can be appointed and can successfully 
propose  its  own ideal  policy.  The  Commission  President  wants  to  nominate  such  a 
Commission,  because  his  ideal  policy  then  becomes  EU  policy.  Therefore,  the 
Commission President nominates a Commissioner with the same ideal policy as himself 
whenever he rejects a proposed Commissioner. 
The Commission President rejects a proposed Commissioner, if  nominating the proposed 
Commissioner leads to a Commission with an ideal policy different from his own. The 
Commission's  ideal  i-policy  is  the  ideal  i-policy  of the  i-median Commissioner.  The 
Commission President thus rejects a proposed Commissioner, if nominating him leads to 
an  ideal i-policy of the  i-median Commissioner that is  different from his own ideal i-
policy  .19.  If the Commission President's ideal policy  does  not belong to the set C,  he 
wants the Commission's ideal policy to be the policy PeE C closest to his ideal policy. 
The  countries  propose  Commissioners  with  ideal  policies  equal  to  their  own  ideal 
policies, unless such Commissioners lead to a Commission with an ideal policy different 
from the Commission President's. In that case they propose  Commissioners with an ideal 
policies equal to the Commission President's ideal policy. 
The country k that is selected to propose a Commission President proposes a President 
whose  ideal  policy  is  in  the  set  C  of effective  Commissions  under  the  consultation 
23 procedure.  Specifically it proposes a Commission President with ideal  policy  Pcp  E C 
that is closest to its own ideal policy. 
Under  the  co-decision  procedure  the  results  are  analogous.  The  set  D  of effective 
Commissions  under  the  co-decision procedure  is  then the  set  of Commissions  whose 
ideal policies belong to the unanimity set U  and to the set CD of successful proposals, 
i.e.,  D = U (l CD. The set D is a subset of  the set C of effective Commissions under the 
consultation procedure, since the set CD of successful proposals is a subset of the set CS 
of successful proposals under the consultation procedure. Figure 15  shows the set D for 
the  configuration  of ideal  policies  used  above.  The  ineffective  Commissions  can  be 
appointed, but they cannot successfully propose their own ideal policies. They propose 
the policies that belong to the set CD and are closest to their ideal policies. These policies 
also belong to the unanimity set U. 
-----Figure 15 about here-----
5. Conclusions 
The spatial theory of Commission appointment and EU policy making characterizes sets 
of effective Commissions, i.e., Commissions that can be appointed and can successfully 
24 propose their own ideal policies, and sets of successful proposals, i.e., proposals that can 
become  EU  poiicy.  It also  sheds  light on the  impact  of institutional  reforms  on the 
Commission's powers. 
Under the  consultation procedure  a  proposal  is  successful  if it  satisfies the following 
requirement: on each dimension a qualified majority in the Council prefers the policy the 
Commission proposes to the status quo. Under the co-decision procedure there are two 
additional  requirements:  on each dimension  (1)  the  Parliament prefers  the  policy the 
Commission proposes to the status quo, and (2) there are no policies the Parliament and a 
qualified majority in the Council prefer to the proposal. 
Effective  Commissions are  Commissions  (1)  that can successfully  propose  their own 
ideal policies, and (2) whose ideal policies are preferred to the status quo by all countries 
and the Parliament. 
The introduction of the co-decision procedure has reduced the Commission's power by 
limiting  the  set of policies  it  can  successfully  propose  and  thus  the  set of effective 
Commissions. The Parliament's right to veto a Commission has further limited the set of 
effective Commissions by restricting the set of  Commissions that can be appointed. 
25 References 
Black, Duncan, (1958),  The  Theory of  Committees and Elections (London:  Cambridge 
University Press). 
Bueno  de  Mesquita,  Bruce  and  Frans  N.  Stokrnan,  (1994),  European  Community 
Decision Making: Models,  Applications and Comparisons (New Haven:  Yale University 
Press). 
Crombez,  Christophe,  (1996),  "Legislative Procedures  in  the  European  Community", 
British Journal of  Political Science, Vol. 26, pp.  199-228. 
Crombez,  Christophe,  (1997),  "The  Co-Decision  Procedure  in  the  European  Union", 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, Forthcoming. 
Nugent,  Neil,  (1994),  The  Government  and  Politics  of the  European  Community 
(London: Macmillan). 
Steunenberg,  Bernard,  (1994),  "Decision  Making  Under  Different  Institutional 
Arrangements:  Legislation by the  European Community", Journal of  Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics, Vol.  150/4, pp. 642-69. 
26 Tsebeiis,  George,  (1994),  "The Power of the  European  Parliament as  a  Conditional 
Agenda Setter", American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, pp. 128-42. 
1 See, for example, Nugent (1994) for a detailed description of  the EU institutions. 
2 Since the model incorporates complete and perfect information, the Commission has no 
particular policy expertise. One could argue that the Commission has incentives to 
develop such expertise, much like congressional committees do in the United States. This 
could be studied in incomplete information extensions of  the model. 
3 The consultation procedure accounts for about two thirds of  legislation (164 opinions in 
1995) and the co-decision procedure for about 15 percent (35 first readings in 1995). The 
cooperation procedure has become less important since the adoption ofthe Treaty of 
Maastricht and is, therefore, not considered. It now accounts for about 10 percent of 
legislation ( 26 first readings in 1995). 
4 The analysis can be extended to other types of single-peaked preferences with different 
countries being pivotal in the Council. 
5 In general, I use the prefix i to refer to dimension i. 
6 The five largest countries (Germany, Spain, France, Italy and the United Kingdom) have 
two Commissioners each, the other countries have one each. 
7 In reality, other Commission Presidents would be proposed, if  the first proposal did not 
obtain unanimity. I do not consider this possibility for simplicity's sake. 
8 The specific assumptions made for the nomination of  the other Commissioners give the 
Commission President an important role in the nomination. This does not necessarily 
follow from the treaties. 
9 I assume that a country can always find a Commissioner with the ideal policy it wants. 
In the policy making process the Commission can be treated as a unitary actor with ideal 
i-policy equal to the ideal i-policy of  the i-median Commissioner, as will be explained 
below. Potential Commissioners with different ideal policies can thus lead to the same 
27 Commission, i.e., a Commission with the same ideal policy. Moreover, different 
Commissions can lead to the same EU policy. This will also be shown below. Since the 
countrie care about EU policy and potential Commissioners with different ideal policies 
can lead to the same EU policy, the assumption seems innocuous. 
[0 I recognize that vote trading over different policy issues is possible even though 
germaneness rules are used and no omnibus legislation is adopted. I do not consider vote 
trading in this model, however. See Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman (1994) for 
logrolling models of  EU policy making. 
[[ In other words Black's median voter theorem applies (Black 1958). 
[2 France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom have 10 votes each; Spain 8; Belgium, 
Greece,  Portugal and the Netherlands  5 each;  Austria and  Sweden 4  each;  Denmark, 
Finland and Ireland 3 each; and Luxembourg 2. 
13  To obtain a qualified majority the proposal needs the support of at least 8 countries. If 
2 of  the largest 5 countries vote against, the support of 11  other countries is necessary. If 
3 of the largest countries vote  against,  no  qualified majority can be  obtained.  Hence, 
countries are ranked such that PI j  is the ideal i-policy of  the country with the most leftist 
ideal i-policy,  PI/  is the ideal i-policy ofthe country with the most rightist ideal i-policy. 
[4 In reality, the Parliament can issue an opinion on the Commission proposal and the 
countries can unanimously amend the Commission proposal. I do not consider these 
opinions and amendments. The Parliament's opinions are non-binding. Therefore, they do 
not affect the equilibrium EU policy in a complete information model. Amendments by a 
unanimous Council are unlikely, since it is unlikely that the Council unanimously prefers 
an i-policy to the Commission's proposal. This would require that all countries have an 
ideal i-policy to the right (left) ofthe Commission's ideal i-policy. 
15  In reality, a Conciliation Committee consisting of  representatives of  the Parliament and 
the countries can negotiate a joint text. The treaties provide for a reversion policy in case 
of  a disagreement in the Conciliation Committee. As a result, the assumption that the 
28 Parliament proposes the joint text does not affect the equilibrium EU policy. In 
equilibrium the Commission determines the reversion policy by making a proposal that 
cannot be amended in the Conciliation Committee. 
16 In reality the countries and the Parliament do not know exactly what issues they will be 
dealing with over a period of  five years. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that 
they have a good idea of  the main issues that will arise, and that they have these issues in 
mind when appointing a Commission. 
17 The conclusions are analogous if  country hi  and thus a qualified majority want to move 
to the left. If  the status quo is between the ideal i-policies of  countries ai and hi, there is 
no qualified majority for any move, and the status quo prevails. 
18 If  the Parliament and countries ai and hi  do not agree on the direction of  change, the 
status quo prevails. If  they all want to move to the left, the analysis is analogous. 
19 In particular, the Commission President rejects a proposed Commissioner if  he raises 
the number of  Commissioners to his left on any dimension to ten or more, and if  the 
proposed Commissioner raises the number of  Commissioners to his right on any 
dimension to eleven or more. I assume for simplicity that the 10th Commissioner is the 
median. In other words, in case of  a tie the smaller change is assumed to win. 
29 Figure 1: General Structure. 
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Figure 13: Unanimity Set. 
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